ABSTRACT: In this paper the real life operation of ULCS (Ultra Large Container
INTRODUCTION
Development of ships for container transport is very fast. During last ten years those ships are "growing" tremendously. Each new ship is actually a prototype for which there is no feedback or previous experience on how she behaves in "real life". This fact puts the masters of those ships in difficult positions where they need a lot of knowledge and intuition to be able to predict the response of a ship in any particular situation. Therefore, their experience is very precious to their colleagues as well as to ship designers.
The project of the container ship has evolved through the history and they became larger and more efficient. In the 1980-s maximal container ship size was 4,500-5,000 TEU (twenty feet equivalent units), mainly because of the limitation on breadth and length imposed by the lock chambers of the Panama Canal. In 1990-s a new transportation net without using the Panama channel was developed, marking the creation of the new Post-Panamax type. Container ships with capacity of up to 10,000 TEU belong to this category. Vessels with capacity of 10,000-14,500 TEU represent Very Large Container Ships (VLCS) or New-Panamax, as they will be able to pass through expanded Panama Canal. The latest generation of container ships is called Ultra Large Container Ships (ULCS), with capacities exceeding 14,500 TEU, and has a tendency to increase (Fig. 1 ). This tendency is most evident within the new project of large container ship with 18,000 TEU, which is currently being built (http://www. worldslargestship. com). Some shipyards are already capable of building even larger container ships, but other restrictions such as width of the Worlds important channels, port depths and infrastructure will have a decisive role for realization of these projects in the future. These large ships represent a challenge in the design process, where a significant role play estimation of design loads and responses to these loads. Particular problem represent fact that dimensions of ULCS are outside the margin of the classification society's rules and those are not readily applicable. Namely, rules are to a great extent based on the past experience, while such experience with ULCSs simply does not exist. New computational methods accounting for different hydroelastic responses of these ships are attempting to be used in their design. Such complex numerical methods are still under development and safety margin resulting from their implementation is actually unknown. Confidence in application of new computational methods may be improved by comparison with model tests and full scale measurements, but outcomes of these are also subjected to the various uncertainties (Hughes and Paik, 2010) .
Hydroelastic vibratory phenomena springing and whipping are the most important consequence of the continuous increase in the ship length and low stiffness of the hull girder. Springing is the steady-state resonant response, caused by the overlapping of the encounter frequency and the natural vibration frequency. Springing increases accumulated fatigue damage especially in quartering and bow seas when resonance may occur with first mode of coupled torsional-horizontal vibrations having rather low natural frequency. Other important vibratory response is whipping, which can be defined as transient elastic vibration of the ship hull girder due to slamming. Although whipping response can contribute to the accumulated fatigue damage, whipping is in the first place important for the verification of the ultimate bending moment capacity of the hull girder. The reason for that is that whipping response may significantly increase the wave frequency vertical wave bending moment (Storhaug, 2009) .
Lifetime extreme values of both wave frequency wave bending moments and whipping bending moments are influenced by the operational parameters related to the heavy weathers. Extreme wave loads and consequently shipping safety are predominantly determined by frequency of encountering heavy seas and also by manoeuvres that ship master undertakes if ship is caught in the bed weathers. Frequency of encountering heavy seas depends on the weather routing policy of the shipping company and also on the procedures of the shipmaster to predict and avoid encountering of the heavy weather. Heavy weather manoeuvring is almost entirely under influence of the ship master, i.e. his voluntary decision to change course and/or ship speed in situations when safety of ship or cargo are in danger. Rerouting of the vessel is a crucial issue as it affects the wave induced loads as well the economy of the transport. For ULCS, the effect on wave induced loads is further amplified by the fact that whipping loads are extremely sensitive to the ship speed (Tuitman, 2010) .
Having recognized crucial importance of the voluntary human actions for the extreme wave loads of containerships, it becomes clear need of interviews and discussions with ship masters (Guedes Soares, 1990) . The purpose of the present paper is to clarify some aspects of decisions that captain of ULCS take with respect to issues of heavy weather avoidance and manoeuvring in heavy weather. The paper describes results of the questionnaire performed during EU FP7 project TULCS and provides further clarification of results by one of experienced masters of ULCS. From the 40 questionnaire sent to the shipmasters of containerships of over 4,000 TEU capacity, 23 answers were usable for analysis and conclusions. Questions are related to the definition of heavy weather and to the criteria for heavy weather avoidance as well as to the manoeuvres undertaken in the heavy weather. The questionnaire consists of 16 questions. The most of them have multiple choice and few (three) of them require that the captain of the ship explains his observations. Some issues include both multiple choice answer and further clarification. Special attention is given to the phenomena that are specifically important for ULCSs as slamming, whipping and springing. The main contribution of the present study to the state of the art is more clear definition of design criteria for ULCS that include operational aspects of these ships. Such criteria, although important, presently do not exist.
The problems during exploitation of ULCS in everyday work have been reported in many areas, but mainly in navigation on bed weather and port handling. During navigating in higher sea states a lot of cases of excessive loads are reported. That threatens the safety and complicates the work. A particular problem is the accurate determination of the time required for a single trip. Today this problem is not only important from the economic point of view but also because of the recently introduced limitations of greenhouse gases emissions. In these cases the help of an onboard integrated decision support system is very important. During the ship's stay in port the manoeuvring problems are often as well as the excessive values of wind forces due to large exposed areas. The paper is organized in following way. After introduction, literature survey describing state-of-the-art of the modelling of heavy weather avoidance and manoeuvring is provided. Literature survey of operational restrictions of "traditional" ships is important, as the ULCS do not have only the specific issues due to high hull flexibility, but they also keep the issues already known for smaller and conventional vessels. In the next section, main operational aspects of ULCS are reviewed in a way that results from the questionnaire are interpreted and commented by the experienced ship master. Finally, the work ended by conclusions and directions for the future research.
LITERATURE SURVEY AND STATE-OF-THE-ART OF THE MODELLING OF HEAVY WEATHER AVOI-DANCE AND MANOEUVRING
The influence of human action on extreme wave-induced loads, which is the focus of the present paper, may be divided into two parts:
-Changes in shipping route in order to avoid heavy seas, -Master's actions in heavy seas. The avoidance of heavy weather is partially taken into account in ship design by accepting Global Wave Statistics (GWS) as the source of the wave data (Hogben et al., 1986) . Data in GWS are obtained by the observations from merchant ships that sail along standard trading routes. In that way, geographical areas with the most severe weather conditions are implicitly avoided in the analysis (Guedes Soares, 1996) . However, in the extrapolation procedure for estimating extreme wave loads, large significant wave heights with very low probability of occurrence are nevertheless taken into account, counteracting in that way the advantage of using GWS data (Moan et al., 2006a) . In real ship operation, such sea states with small probability of exceedance are often avoided, because most of ship masters receive and take into account weather forecast and other information relevant for the safe navigation.
The avoidance of heavy weather during ship design process may be modelled by modifying the original wave scatter diagrams obtained from GWS. The modifications can be done by truncating the probability density function of the significant wave heights at limiting value H Slim . The probability of the truncated area should then be added to the sea states bellow the limiting significant wave heights. Moan et al. (2006a) proposes 3 methods to modify the original scatter diagram:
-To add the probability of the truncated area just below limiting significant wave height H Slim , -To add the probability of the truncated area uniformly bellow H Slim , -To allow a small probability of encountering sea states above H Slim by reducing the tail of the probability density function. The truncated probability is then distributed uniformly below H Slim .
First method approximates situation where the ship master avoids the heavy weather by manoeuvring the vessel into just calmer sea states. The second method is represented by the assumption that the sea state forecasts are available to the master and that rerouting is made. The last option accounts the fact that the significant wave heights higher than H Slim cannot be absolutely avoided in the reality (Moan et al., 2006a) .
Besides the selection of the modification method of the wave scatter diagram, the crucial question is the choice of an appropriate limiting significant wave height H Slim . According to the report of ISSC 2006, the operational limits for containerships are about 10.5 m and 6m for full load and ship in ballast respectively (Moan et al., 2006b ). The effect of operational limit on the long-term extreme bending moments of 9,200 TEU containership is studied by Ćorak et al. (2013) . They applied an approximate method to account for whipping effects in the long-term distribution and concluded that truncation of the scatter diagram can lead to the reduction of the long-term extreme combined (wave and whipping) bending moments by more than 20%.
The joint probability distribution of the significant wave heights and mean zero-crossing periods is used to model the sea environment in the long term. As the marginal distribution of the significant wave heights, the three-parameter Weibull distribution is selected, while for the conditional distribution of the mean zero-crossing periods, the log-normal distribution is employed. Parameters of these distributions for each of wave zones in GWS are provided by Bitner-Gregersen et al. (1995) .
When the ship is caught in heavy seas, there are two manoeuvres that the ship master can undertake to avoid excessive ship rolling and hull damage (Guedes Soares, 1990 ). These are:
-Changing course from beam seas to head or following seas, -Voluntary speed reduction. The course changes in heavy weather are mainly to avoid the ship capsizing or excessive ship rolling amplitudes that may interfere with normal working activities on board (Guedes Soares, 1990) . Consequently, the probability of head seas is much higher in heavy weather than in normal sea conditions. However, this is valid only for smaller ships (less than about 200m in length). For large ships, the course changes in heavy weather are not so frequent. The explanation for this finding could be that the masters of large ships feel safe even in rather rough seas.
Another important manoeuvre in rough seas is the speed reduction. This action is not dependent on the ship size (Guedes Soares, 1990) . The reasons for speed reduction may generally be divided into two categories (Dubrovsky, 2000) :
-Natural reasons, such as the added resistance of wind and waves, change of submerged part of the hull, change of wake field and loss of thrust, -Technical or "design" reasons that are controlled by the shipmaster, such as very large motion amplitudes, velocities and accelerations, slamming, green seas, overload of the main engine. The natural reasons influence the ship speed at relatively low significant wave heights, while in heavy seas the shipmaster decides whether to reduce speed. There is no strict rule that determines under which conditions the shipmaster would reduce the speed, so various authors have proposed different criteria (Dubrovsky, 2000) .
Speed reduction curve for container ships is proposed by ABS (2010). According to ABS (2010), full speed is maintained up to significant wave height of 6 m. Then, speed is reduced to 75% of full speed. At significant wave height of 9 m, speed is further reduced to 50% of the full speed. Finally, at significant wave height of 12 m, speed is reduced to the 25% of the full speed, which is the minimum speed to maintain ship manoeuvrability. The effect of the speed reduction is analysed by Ćorak et al (2013) on 9,200 TEU containership. They found that the ABS speed reduction curve may reduce the long-term combined (wave and whipping) BM by about 18% compared to the constant ship speed of 15 knots. The speed reduction profile which is constructed based on ship operability analysis can reduce the combined BM by about 21%. This clearly demonstrates importance of appropriate speed reduction profile in ship structural design.
In the recent years, Decision Support Systems (DSS) are developed to estimate effects of course and speed changes statistics on the most critical wave-induced ships extreme responses and fatigue damage accumulation. Such systems are often based on extensive instrumentation installed on board of new-build ships, which are used for continuous monitoring of engine and hull performance, for voyage performance and evaluation, etc. DSS is especially important for voyages of long duration without opportunity to seek shelter (Moan et al., 2006) . The development of operator guidance systems is nowadays based on numerical models that introduce probabilistic and risk-based approaches . It is to be noted that the on-site estimation of sea state parameters at the location of an advancing ship forms a crucial and fundamental problem to which a perfect solution has not been found yet .
DSS may be divided on DSS for strategic and DSS for tactical decisions. The former systems are intended for strategic decisions as route planning, while the latter are related to the rerouting, i.e. the manoeuvring in heavy weather. A consistent risk based concept for a DSS which will support a master and his crew in making tactical decisions is presented by BitnerGregersen and Skjong (2009). The presented DSS was intended to provide information and guidance by offering an evaluation of probabilities and consequences, giving insight into the uncertainty of the information and into the risk related to relevant hazards. It is based on the modern reliability methodology and addresses uncertainties related to environmental models, load predictions, ship data and response calculations. Further development toward practical application of the concept is presented by Papanikolau et al. (2014) . That study presented recent advances in implementing uncertainty models for the development of the modern decision support systems as guidance to ship's master.
ULCS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF A MASTER
The questionnaire is performed during EU FP7 project TULCS. From the 40 questionnaire sent, 23 masters of large containerships (over 4,000 TEU) filled questionnaire. The masters have been asked to report, on an anonymous basis, their behaviour in situations that are supposed to be harsh for container ships. The questionnaire consists of 16 questions. Results are analysed with the aid of one of experienced masters of ULCSs who helped in clarification and understanding of answers.
Familiarity of ship masters with different phenomena relevant for ULCSs
The first question in questionnaire was related to the familiarity of mariners with physical phenomena relevant for ULCS. Results indicate that slamming, whipping and green water on deck are actually the most often experienced by ship masters. Thus, 14, 11 and 10 out of 23 masters encountered slamming, whipping and green water respectively. However, it is surprising that parametric rolling is almost unknown problem, as only 1 out of 23 captains declared to encounter that phenomenon. Steady state springing vibrations are also rarely identified (5 out of 23) as well as rogue waves (4 out of 23). It is questionable if masters can distinguish all these phenomena and clearly identify each of them. Definition of rogue waves may be particularly misinterpreted as master may think of freak waves as large waves inside the storm. If it is clearly stated that rogue waves are large waves which are not related to the weather conditions, i.e. that they can appear in relatively calm weather, then such phenomenon is practically unknown to the shipmasters. However, explanation of rogue wave phenomenon may require some elaboration and possibly showing some photographs to shipmasters in order to clarify what is being asked. That approach is undertaken by Buckley (2005) when, in addition to the questionnaire, an interview with masters and mates has been accomplished. Only after detailed description of requested events and after showing photos, mariners eventually recalled that they had seen "something similar".
Definition of heavy weather
The next two questions were about definition of the heavy weather. Almost all of shipmasters identify height of waves as the most important parameter for shipping safety. However, most of them indicate that wave period may also be critical for definition of heavy seas. Although not explicitly stated, it is probably related to the occurrence of the resonance in the beam sea conditions. Most of shipmasters find also that wind speed is rather disturbing and may influence safety of the ship and containers. All shipmasters indicated that heavy weather conditions start when significant wave height reaches 6-8 meters.
Results are in relatively good agreement with finding reported by ISSC 2006, that the operational limits for containerships are about 10.5 m and 6 m for full load and ship in ballast respectively (Moan et al., 2006b) . Although it would be expected that definition of heavy weather depends on ship heading angle, that influence could not be identified from the obtained results. It is to be noted that results of questionnaire agree very well with guidance of ABS (2010) that speed reduction begins at the significant wave height of 6 m. It is not known from the questionnaire, however, what happens at significant wave heights above 8 m. There are two problems related to such most severe sea states. Firstly, encountering such severe seas is so rare event that it is lost in any statistical treatment of results. Secondly, ship found is such extreme conditions are exposed to the high risk of structural damages or losing cargo. In addition, each master who has once experienced the destructive force of the storm develops the great respect for the power of nature and, as a rule, tries to avoid any similar experience. Therefore, the majority of masters avoid heavy seas by modifying the route or simply waiting for the storm to pass. If they passed through such storm they do not feel very comfortable to recognize that. The reason is that masters are always the main responsible persons for their crews and ships and they, if recognize that the ship was found in the danger, eventually need to answer the unpleasant question: why that dangerous weather condition has not been avoided?
Usage of weather forecasts and weather routing systems
All shipmasters declared to use weather forecast that is updated on the daily basis. Also, 21 of 23 masters are using some of weather routing systems. Some of systems used are based only on sea states (Bridge, Bon Voyage (Fig. 2) ) while some of them are based on ship responses and therefore are ship specific (Octopus) (Fig. 3) . Two third of the seamen answered that they would give absolute priority to the ship safety, i.e. that they would ignore any time constraint and commercial reasons if they should pass through zones with heavy weather conditions. However, one third of the interviewed masters would at least reconsider warning of weather forecasts to meet schedule. Influence of weather routing on shipping safety was commented by Faulkner in his discussion to the report of ISSC Committee "Environment" (Faulkner, 1997) as: "Weather routing of ships, which was introduced primarily to safeguard ships against extreme sea conditions, is not working satisfactory. Many mariners are quite sceptical about it, and ship masters often find that weather routing tries to safeguard charter arrival requirements rather than ship safety. One should also remember that computer assisted accidents do occur." Overconfidence in weather routing may lead not only to the loss of containers on board, but it could have disastrous consequences. Typical example is capsize bulk carrier MV Derbyshire, sank in the North West Pacific during typhoon Orchid in September 1980. The trace of the typhoon was rather unpredictable, as Orchid executed three high-speed conditionally unstable cyclonic loops that could be one of the possible causes of foundering (Faulkner, 1998) . Prudent shipmaster would not fully rely to the weather routing or long-term forecast, but will permanently monitor actual sea conditions and short-term forecasts. Safety of people as well as ship and the cargo is of the ultimate importance for the shipmasters and shipowners. Captains testify that they are very rarely or never exposed to the pressures of shipowners to keep strict schedule at the expense of safety. The lost of each container means downgrading of the company as well as the master as the most responsible person for the ship safety. One example of heavy weather avoidance by master who is using weather routing system is presented in Fig. 4 . Ship left Mediterranean Sea on 04 th January at 4AM on her route toward Southampton. Distance between Gibraltar and Southampton reads 1191NM, that takes 69 hours assuming average speed of 17.3 kn. Weather routing software predicted ship position after 20 hours, i.e. on midnight between 4 th and 5 th January 2014, as presented in Fig. 4 left. So far, ship would cross 356NM, while in that time she would encounter wind seas of 2.2 m and swell of 7.9 m. Combined wave height is thus estimated to 8.2 m. Waves would predominantly come from portside inducing high ship rolling and such waves already deserve attention and caution of ship master. Predicted ship position and wave situation 36 hours later are shown in Fig. 4 right. On 06 th January at noon, ship would cross in total 962NM, with 230NM still to go. According to the meteorological prediction, ship in that time would encounter wind waves of 4.3 m and swell of 8.9 m, while the combined wave height is estimated to 9.8 m. As the predominant wave direction is beam seas, 9.8 m is the wave height that prudent ship master would unconditionally avoid. As may be seen from Fig. 4 right, storm center with wave heights of above 13 m is rather close to the ship track. By taking into account uncertainty in meteorological predictions that are done for several days in advance, it could happen that ship is caught by storm centre and consequently shipmaster decided to wait for better conditions in one of safe ports close to Gibraltar. Thus, master waited for three days before forecast was favourable. Obviously, there was some delay in schedule arrival, which partially could be overcome by imposing higher speed. But in principle, master should not be very concerned by delay, especially if delay is anticipated and if the port authorities are informed on time about that. Very often ships arrive in time but they have to wait before entering the port because of traffic congestion or some other reasons. Conclusion is that safety of ship and cargo is on the first place. It should be mentioned that presented manoeuvring was possible because ship could wait in safe place. However, for route in the North Atlantic such heavy weather avoidance would be difficult (Moan et al., 2006a) . 
Criteria for course and speed changes
Next couple of questions was related to the response criteria for heavy weather manoeuvring. Most of shipmasters indicated the rolling angle as the most important criterion for manoeuvring. Actions are undertaken when rolling angle amplitude exceeds about 18 degrees. Moreover, it seems that high ship stability represent a serious problem because of short natural period which makes rolling very unpleasant. With that respect, natural rolling period is obviously very important parameter, as large amplitudes are related to the resonant phenomenon when wave period becomes equal to the rolling period. Therefore, except wave height, wave period is also important parameter to decide about heavy weather manoeuvring. According to the statements of ship masters the heading angle could be changed by 25° to 30° at least. The change in heading should be made in the direction in order to face the waves. It is likely that in the case of the excessive rolling angle, change of the heading is more important than the speed reduction.
These results agree reasonably well with interviews of experienced shipmasters presented by Guedes Soares (1990) . He concluded that in heavy seas it is necessary to treat speed reduction and course changes together. The relationship between these two variables depends on the initial heading. In head seas, speed reduction is much more frequent than course changes. In bow seas, both occur equally often. With increasing seas, the tendency will be to decrease speed and to have head or following seas.
The final action reported by Guedes Soares (1990) is to stop engines and just let ship heave to. However, authors of the present paper consider that such situation should never happen as ship will be naturally driven by wind and waves to the beam seas. Such situation is considered as the most unfavourable and should be avoided in any case and therefore some minimal manoeuvring speed should always be maintained.
Although, it should be stated that present-day containerships are basically safe, even in such extreme situations. This is true if stability is carefully checked and limitations of weight and number of containers on deck are respected. The example of accident of ALP China is often cited as a proof of containership safety. That Post Panamax container ship survived a 24 hour hurricane, for one hour even with a total black out on board. Although some containers are lost and some overturned on board, this example if often cited as a proof of basic safety of these ships (Payer, 2001) .
Next criterion for manoeuvring is the slamming. However, there is no clear threshold slamming frequency when manoeuvring would occur. Authors believe that one single slamming impact would be enough warning to shipmaster to make some actions. In the case of slamming the course would be changed for 5 to 10 degrees with the first impact and shipmaster would wait and see what would be the ship response. The main reason why shipmasters change the course before speed lies in the fact that the course can be changed much faster. For comparison, the rate of change of 10 degrees of heading angle can be achieved in a minute. Within the same time, the number of main engine rpm can be reduced by approximately 0.7. The problem which is identified here is related to the definition of slamming for containerships. Slamming can be defined as an impulsive load with high pressure peaks that occurs during impact between a body and water. Generally, three types of slamming loads exist; flat bottom slamming, bow flare slamming and stern slamming (Hughes and Paik, 2010) . Bottom slamming occurs when the relative displacement at any section exceeds the local draught and the ships bottom undergoes a severe hydrodynamic impact on re-entry. The impact is sufficiently rapid and intense with very short duration and long decay time. Master can easily feel and detect such impact. Bow flare slamming is caused by a rapidly decreasing angle of the bow sections with the horizon, both in the transverse and in the longitudinal directions. Unlike bottom slamming, impact load due to bow flare slamming has weaker intensity and longer duration time with a short decay. It is therefore possible that shipmaster less clearly identify bow flare slamming compared to the bottom slamming. It could happen that, as a consequence, manoeuvring with respect to bow flare slamming occurs with the some delay. Due to small probability of occurrence of bottom slamming and highly pronounced flare, in the case of large container ships, only bow flare slamming is important (Faltinsen, 1990) . Stern slamming often occurs when containerships are moored near ports, as a consequence of swell.
Implications of cargo handling on ship safety
Except manoeuvring relating to weather conditions, safety of container ships may be affected by the still water loads, which are the consequence of the distribution of containers (Fig. 5) . The distribution of containers on board depends on many factors. Captains get a loading/unloading plan before arrival at port and they can make comments and objections to certain extend. It's not easy to make a plan for loading. The containers distribution must be such that: it follows the voyage plan of loading/ unloading; does not cause excessive structural loads; allows easy access to refrigerated containers; meets the rules of incomepatible cargoes. In addition, the captain must take care to avoid unnecessary maneuvers of harbor cranes that significantly increase the cost of loading/unloading. It is interesting to cite observations of ISSC 2009, Committee of Quasi Static Response (Aksu et al., 2009) , with respect to still water loads of containership Napoli, which suffered structural failure of hull girder while on passage through the English Channel on January 2007. Two points may be extracted from Committee conclusions in relation to the cargo handling safety issues: -There were discrepancies between the declared weights and actual weights of containers onboard. Although these weight discrepancies probably could not have caused alone the hull girder failure, it would have contributed to the reduction of the safety margin between the total bending moment experienced and the strength of the hull. The longitudinal hull girder stresses cannot be accurately controlled unless weight of containers is determined before embarkation. -The vessel had left port with bending moments in excess of the permissible seagoing maximum value. This was a result of a draught with enough under clearance so that the vessel could leave the port at any tide condition. It was highlighted that the practice of arriving and departing from berths, in a loaded condition that was in excess of permissible seagoing maxima, was potentially detrimental to safety but is commonplace within the container ship industry. 
CONCLUSIONS
The presented paper provides clarification of some aspects of decisions that captain of ULCS take with respect to issues of heavy weather avoidance and manoeuvring in heavy weather. The masters are just gaining the experience at such huge ships and need a lot of knowledge and intuition to be able to predict the response of a ULCS in any particular situation. Their experience is very precious to their colleagues as well as to ship designers. This research is performed by analysing questionnaire filled by masters of containerships and by discussing outcome of questionnaire by one experienced master of ULCS. Findings of the research may be summarized as follows: -Slamming, whipping and green water are known phenomena experienced by almost all captains. However, parametric rolling, springing and rogue waves are very rarely identified. It can be recommended to amend questionnaire by interviews where masters could be better explained about those issues. -All shipmasters indicated that heavy weather conditions start when significant wave height reaches 6 -8 meters. At such sea states manoeuvres are required. -Majority of masters do not have large confidence on the weather routing or long-term forecast, but permanently monitor actual sea conditions and short-term forecasts. -The most important criterion for rerouting is the rolling angle of about 18 degrees, when course would change toward head or following seas. In head seas, single events of slamming and green water are generally enough to reduce speed or to adjust the course.
